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THE FUNCTION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE FOR LOW-INTENSITY  
CONFLICT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The case for the value of HUMINT in LIC is based on several principle considerations. First, the nature of LIC compared to peacetime competition, conflict, and war. Second, the application of intelligence to support operations in LIC across the operational continuum. Third, the unique contributions of human collection of information to advise decision-makers on responses to LIC. Fourth, the challenges now and in the future for our decision-makers and the intelligence community to meet the requirements of LIC. And last, recommendations to improve efficiency in planning, execution, and exploitation of all available intelligence resources.

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## Introduction

Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) places complex demands on senior American political and military leaders. The United States must take cognizance of--and weigh its interests in--virtually any political conflict, wherever it occurs in the world. This is particularly true in the Western Hemisphere, where the U.S. is the dominate political, military, and economic power. Our national interests in any conflict must be determined in the context of various sociological, economic, historical, democratic, and legal issues. We must always consider how our actions will be received by the international community. Thus, no perfect solutions exist for the inevitable requests for U.S. support in LIC.

But how do our national decision-makers determine proper U.S. response to LIC? Where do they get the answers to their questions as they seek an appropriate response? Some information is gathered from open sources: commercial publications, news media, government publications, and educational material. Some intelligence comes from technical sensors: signals, imagery, and electronic collection systems. In LIC, human intelligence (HUMINT) remains a significant source of information.

Commanders are traditionally disappointed with the (HUMINT) provided before a crisis, especially when the National Command Authority directs a military contingency operation. For example, the Washington Post reported that General Carl W. Stiner, Commander of U.S. Forces Panama, Operation Just Cause,



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was alarmed that he did not have better HUMINT on the Dignity Battalions. Reportedly, one Congressional source stated that when the tactical commanders asked why they didn't have the intelligence, the CIA replied that they probably did not ask for it. The article went on to conclude that even though the CIA is responsible for HUMINT, there is no mechanism for sharing such intelligence, even when it bears on military matters with the Pentagon.<sup>1</sup> The Washington Post reporter may not be aware of all intelligence sharing procedures, but the implication is valid.

We cannot condone or afford less than maximum efficiency from intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting support. Political leaders need the maximum amount of time to contemplate what should be done. Planning intelligence requires long lead-time, and intelligence resources are limited. Therefore, we must exploit all available sources. Ambassadors are responsible for advising the President on desired U.S. reactions to LIC. But, they will procrastinate, and rightly so, hoping an option will appear that does not include military force. Consequently, if the intelligence system has not been activated and focused on this priority, information requirements of the decision-makers may be collected from a reactive rather than proactive intelligence system.

Our HUMINT organizations should work in concert with host-nation personnel. The overt commitment of U.S. intelligence personnel communicates resolve to foreign government leaders. Bilateral intelligence activities help support and educate host

nation leaders and provides a superb learning environment for our HUMINT personnel.

This paper describes LIC, the application of intelligence in LIC, how HUMINT contributes to intelligence input to decision-makers, and outlines U.S. HUMINT capabilities. It then recommends several ideas to improve the efficiency of HUMINT collection in support of operations in LIC.

#### Definitions of LIC

In order to understand the function of human intelligence in LIC, we must first see how LIC fits into the concept of military actions as a response in the operational continuum. Test Pub, JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, January 1990, states that the operational continuum means that nations are in one of three states, peacetime competition, conflict, or war, within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted.<sup>2</sup> The strategic environment within each nation consists of a variety of conditions (political, economic, and military) and a range of threats that occur in response to those conditions. Alternatives for a government to project national power include: moral and political example, military strength, economic incentives, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance, and developmental assistance.<sup>3</sup> A military response to threats is an option across the operational continuum.

Peacetime competition is a condition wherein political, economic, informational, and military measures, short of combat operations, are employed to achieve national objectives. Examples of U.S. military activities in peacetime competition include but are not limited to: joint or combined training exercises, nation building activities, disaster relief operations, security assistance, and shows of force. Conflict is an armed struggle between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Irregular forces predominate; however, regular forces are often involved in conflicts. Limited objectives may be achieved by direct application of force. War is the sustained use of military forces between nations or within a nation. Regular and irregular forces conduct battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited or general.<sup>4</sup>

U.S. Army and Air Force Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, define LIC as:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.<sup>5</sup>



LIC is a broad endeavor within which nonmilitary aspects predominate. The application of the military instrument in LIC involves types of operations which could occur across the entire operational continuum. U.S. military aspects of LIC include four categories of operations: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping support, and peacetime contingency operations. FM 100-20 definitions follow:

Insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Counterinsurgency includes those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Peacekeeping includes efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace.

Peacetime contingencies are normally short-term, rapid projection or employment of military forces in conditions short of war. Such employment can also require a large, highly visible buildup of US military forces over extended periods of time.<sup>6</sup>

Robert M. Gates, former Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and now the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, believes that counternarcotics, narcoterrorism and the adversary action of a state governed directly or indirectly by narcotic cartels will be added as "discrete" LIC tasks.<sup>7</sup>

Additionally, the U.S. military must be prepared to: assist other nations against internal and external threats, combat terrorism by maintaining a capability to respond directly, and assist interagency efforts to suppress international drug trafficking. However, the primary role of the U.S. military in LIC is to promote the security of U.S. allies through assistance programs that focus on training, advisory assistance, intelligence, logistics, health services, and engineer support. Thus, LIC involves strategic, operational, and tactical considerations throughout the operational continuum to insure military and government agency operations are integrated into a coherent and unified plan for accomplishment of national security objectives.<sup>8</sup>

#### Application of Intelligence in LIC

Intelligence is critical to the success of operations conducted in LIC. General Woerner, former CINCSOUTH, concluded that intelligence was the bedrock of USSOUTHCOM efforts in LIC. Commanders depended on near real-time intelligence and the exchange of that intelligence with key Latin American

officials.<sup>9</sup> A commander must have timely and accurate all-source intelligence to determine the political, military, economic, and social conditions of a country, plus identify threats and establish goals upon which to build a strategy and campaign plan. The commander should ensure that procedures allow the sharing of intelligence from agencies active in the region, including military sources, U.S. government agencies, and foreign agencies.<sup>10</sup>

One method of categorizing intelligence is to associate it with the level of war for which it is used. Strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence differ primarily in the level of application but may also vary in scope and detail.

Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military strategy at the national level is strategic intelligence.<sup>11</sup> Strategic intelligence forecasts challenges facing the United States and our allies, thereby, providing the basis for preventive measures to defend against these challenges. We thus seek to deal with these challenges early, when they are more susceptible to external influence and when we can preclude the need for direct military intervention. To be effective, strategic intelligence must provide data bases and estimates about developments in the Third World. Data bases are created from area studies which incorporate eight elements of strategic intelligence: armed forces, key personalities, economy, geography, politics, science and technology, sociology, and transportation and telecommunications. Areas studies provide an

in-depth reference on such issue as social values, traditions, and taboos.<sup>12</sup>

Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations is operational intelligence.<sup>13</sup> Traditionally, Congress does not allocate sufficient resources to satisfy the needs of each country in which the U.S. has national interests. Therefore, leaders must decide where to best apply these limited resources to best satisfy U.S. interests. The capabilities of the threat against these countries should be analyzed. It is critical to identify and assess the strategic and operational capabilities of the enemy and the nature of the threat facing our allies. Examples of such threat strategic capabilities which should be assessed include: national leadership, communications, morale, popular support, and logistics.<sup>14</sup> Operational intelligence seeks to identify the enemy's centers of gravity to be attacked or destabilized and provides focus for the commander's campaign plan.

Intelligence required for the planning and execution of tactical operations is tactical intelligence.<sup>15</sup> If U.S. military forces are committed to a conflict, then tactical intelligence supports the commander in planning and executing his operations plan and fighting battles.

Strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence include contributions from the capabilities of all intelligence disciplines: signals, human, imagery, and counterintelligence. Each discipline provides a unique ability to collect particular bits of information. Information is collected by either

technical sensors or human sources. Technical sensors can collect images, communications, and electronic, magnetic, acoustic or heat variant signatures. Information collected through human sources includes data from open sources, controlled sources, or military operations. Information collected, fused, analyzed, transformed into intelligence, and then communicated to the commander or decision-maker is the basic ideal for the intelligence system across the operational continuum.

### Intelligence Demands in LIC

Robert M. Gates concluded that decision-makers are only beginning to come to grips with defining LIC issues coherently, attacking it analytically and countering it operationally. The foundation for U.S. efforts in confronting the threat in LIC lies in intelligence. That is understanding the problem, collecting information, analyzing the information, and providing the decision-maker with a framework and, increasingly often, the means for combatting the threat.<sup>16</sup>

Intelligence analysts look for certain activities, or lack thereof, to provide indicators of what an opponent plans or could attempt in the future. Intelligence collectors are tasked to look for these particular activities so analysts can draw conclusions and provide intelligence to decision-makers. The analyst integrates information from all sources to confirm indicators of enemy activities. Analysts develop a hypothesis of how the enemy may act. An analyst's hypothesis can be proven

false based on evidence but never proven true in advance.<sup>18</sup>

Field Manual 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, provides a detailed listing of activities and affiliated indicators for possible enemy courses of action across the operational continuum. It is not necessary to list multiple examples of enemy activities and possible indicators used by analysts for each of the military operations options in LIC, however, some points of reference may be beneficial to appreciate the intelligence demands in LIC.

Intelligence for support to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations must focus on the people and social issues. The identity and whereabouts of the leaders and covert infrastructure, issues causing popular discontent, organization of the resistance elements, logistical support mechanisms, and the leader's goals or intentions are all key intelligence questions.

The first line of defense in combatting terrorism is intelligence. Anti-terrorism support is deterring the act of terrorism through active and passive measures (e.g., surveillance devices, published warnings, and road barriers). Counterterrorism is the employment of forces to deal proactively with terrorist situations. Although the nature of terrorist groups often makes them difficult to penetrate, intelligence is essential to identify the threat and provide timely threat warning. This includes evaluation of the terrorist's capabilities, tactics, targeting strategy, and then disseminating the intelligence to all interested organizations.<sup>18</sup>

Peacekeeping operations often involves ambiguous situations requiring U.S. forces to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. Even though all parties consent to the peacekeeping operation, security must remain a high priority.<sup>19</sup>

During peacetime, commanders configure their intelligence support to insure that collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence meets command requirements. These requirements include timely indications of threat changes and warning of possible offensive actions, the current situation in areas of high interest, maintenance of pertinent data bases, estimates for operational planning, and assessments for security assistance programs.<sup>20</sup>

Intelligence support is a key component of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) plans. FID operations work on the principle that the host-nation government is taking responsibility for the political, economic, informational, and military action to defeat the threat. Intelligence support includes counterintelligence efforts such as training and assistance in host-nation counternarcotics and anti-terrorism operations.<sup>21</sup>

Intelligence for contingency operations is particularly critical. The rapid employment of U.S. forces requires precise planning, accurate, detailed, timely, and tailored all-source intelligence. Time for planning and execution is typically short. This requires that intelligence planners be included immediately to evaluate what essential elements of information may be satisfied and this advice factored into the selection of a

course of action. As an example, rescue operations require detailed information on such things as the thickness of doors, exact routes and time schedule of enemy guards, and recognition points along ingress and regress routes. The time required to collect this information must be considered in the plan.<sup>22</sup>

Counternarcotics operations place special demands on the intelligence system to support and coordinate with multiple agencies to interdict drug shipments and production procedures. Again, intelligence collectors are tasked to collect information to help analysts find indicators and provide advice to decision-makers on how, when, and where to best spend critical resources for the best results. Locating routes drug cartels use to transport cocaine permit commanders to position technical systems and HUMINT collectors at choke points or places where cocaine cargo is most vulnerable to detection and interdiction.

#### HUMINT Contributions to LIC

Human Intelligence or HUMINT provides critical information to decision-makers during peacetime, conflict, and war. HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided from human sources.<sup>23</sup>

HUMINT collection involves both overt, or open, and clandestine operations. Overt collection includes attache and diplomatic reporting; debriefings of refugees, emigres, defectors, line-crossers, travelers (official and unofficial), and ex-hostages; interrogations of prisoners-of-war; and



observations by military mobile training teams. Open source material (e.g., newspapers, magazines, textbooks, official and government documents) provides significant amounts of information to update intelligence data bases on areas of U.S. interests. During tactical operations normal reconnaissance efforts, patrolling, and reporting from listening and observation posts are all open HUMINT collection.

The clandestine part of HUMINT involves case officers and controlled agents. Clandestine operations are activities to collect intelligence or to counter intelligence efforts of opponents, conducted in such a way as to insure secrecy or concealment.<sup>24</sup> The case officers are U.S. nationals; the agents, or controlled sources, are foreign nationals whose identity is concealed.<sup>25</sup> Some tactical military intelligence organizations conduct clandestine HUMINT collection during war or periods of national crisis.

While HUMINT generates smaller quantities of information than technical sensors, and is more time consuming, it often provides the "golden nuggets," the most critically important information.<sup>26</sup> Often HUMINT will be the only intelligence source that can provide insight into some of the most critical questions commanders and civilian leaders have to assist them in their deliberation of choosing alternatives in support of LIC challenges. HUMINT may be the only source that can provide insight into the opponent's intentions.

The Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report concluded that HUMINT is critically important for the collection

of information in the Third World. Technical intelligence collection systems cannot read minds and judge the character, strengths, and weaknesses of key individuals in LIC. Knowing this information is critical in LIC support operations.<sup>27</sup>

Brigadier General John F. Stewart, when he was the J-2 of USSOUTHCOM, wrote about the significance of HUMINT in LIC. By the very nature of LIC, where the struggle is between a government and an opponent for the loyalty of the people, HUMINT, particularly tactical HUMINT, is potentially the most important intelligence weapon in our arsenal. While sometimes unreliable and vulnerable, HUMINT has the potential to provide the crucial warning on an enemy that operates in small numbers, normally avoids direct confrontation, and selects targets based on careful understanding of vulnerabilities.<sup>28</sup>

#### HUMINT Capabilities in National Organizations

Many government agencies and organizations have HUMINT functions or capabilities. They possess valuable information useful for analysis by the national intelligence community. By knowing which organizations already have human-gathering information collection responsibilities and the availability of data bases, we can determine with whom we must coordinate to gather available information rather than tasking to collect new intelligence. To better understand the HUMINT capabilities in U.S. government organizations, we should focus on the CIA,

diplomatic agencies, Department of Defense organizations, and several other departments, bureaus, and agencies.

### Central Intelligence Agency

The Director of the CIA is the President's advisor for intelligence. The Director plays an important role as the leader of the intelligence community. The Director of the CIA also has the authority and responsibility for national clandestine collection of HUMINT. The Director of CIA coordinates all intelligence operations. Some of his assigned duties include:

- advise and make recommendations to the National Security Council in matters concerning intelligence activities and coordination of such activities as relate to national security

- correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government

- protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures.<sup>31</sup>

Additionally, and uniquely, the CIA is charged with conducting approved covert actions. Covert actions are secret operations designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons to support U.S. policy. They may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities. Covert actions are designed so that U.S. government sponsorship can not be confirmed, often called plausible denial. However, covert actions are not intelligence, although it is a

very important additional mission of the CIA. Robert Gates reported that less than 5% of the CIA's budget and less than 3% of CIA personnel are involved in covert actions.<sup>32</sup>

#### American Ambassadors and the State Department

The Ambassador is the President's representative in a foreign country. He is responsible for carrying out U.S. foreign policy while advising the President and State Department. The Ambassador must be fully aware of all intelligence operations in his country. Even if a U.S. military Commander-In-Chief (combatant commander) wants an intelligence collection mission, he must get the Ambassadors's concurrence. Conversely, intelligence collectors can not afford to make errors that may embarrass the Ambassador and the U.S. government.<sup>31</sup>

The Ambassador has an embassy staff and a country team with access to valuable information. The country team provides liaison with host nation representatives and offers advice to the Ambassador. Commanders and senior military intelligence officers should insure that close coordination occurs between the country team and intelligence organizations.

The State Department relies on diplomatic reporting channels, intelligence agencies, and open sources for intelligence. Daily intelligence summaries, for internal use within the department, and long term assessments on economics, terrorism, narcotics, political, physical, cultural, and economic geography are conducted.<sup>32</sup>

## Department of Defense Organizations

The Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for requirements management, collection, processing, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence for the Department of Defense (DoD). DIA operates the Defense Attache System. Attaches are contributed by all five services and are accredited diplomats. They provide military advice to the Ambassador, maintain liaison with the host country's military services, support the security assistance program for the host country, and report overtly collected information. DIA also is the HUMINT manager for the DoD.

The Army has military organizations with HUMINT specialists assigned down to division level. Additionally, soldiers provide HUMINT during surveillance or reconnaissance missions. Each intelligence officer insures that all appropriate data bases are accessed for information while information requests are forwarded up the chain of command and tasking for information passed down to subordinate units.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine organizations also have HUMINT capabilities at the operational and tactical level. Emphasis on sharing of intelligence among the services increases during joint operations.

## Other Departments with HUMINT Collection

Several other departments have human-gathering information

functions of interest to military analysts for LIC. The Department of Commerce briefs travelling officials on areas of concern about the status of technology in target areas and has attaches in most U.S. Embassies. The Department of Treasury collects foreign financial and monetary data. The Department of Energy collects political, economic, and technical data on foreign energy capabilities and nuclear weapons testing. The Department of Agriculture has approximately 100 specialists who work as agricultural attaches in 70 embassies and report on foreign policies, and analyze supply and demand, commercial trade relationships, and market opportunities.<sup>33</sup>

Three other organizations also contribute to human intelligence gathering for use in LIC. The Drug Enforcement Agency has several responsibilities: identifying members of foreign and domestic drug trafficking organizations, determining drug trafficking patterns, and determining drug money laundering techniques. The Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, provides significant amounts of information from research of open source documents.<sup>34</sup> And last, the Federal Bureau of Investigation collects information on terrorist activities and other criminal activities that may be of interest to analysts. The FBI has legal attaches in approximately 15 embassies.<sup>35</sup>

#### Observations and Recommendations

So far we have reviewed the definition of LIC, analyzed the role of intelligence and specifically HUMINT in LIC, and briefly

summarized the applicable HUMINT capabilities of various national and military organizations. Clearly, there are plenty of challenges now and in the future for our decision-makers and the intelligence community to meet the requirements of LIC. We can improve efficiency in our planning, execution, and exploitation of all available resources, as the following recommendations indicate.

### Combined Intelligence Activities

Whenever possible, U.S. intelligence operations should be combined with those of the host nation. Such partnerships offer several major advantages. First, these bilateral activities provide a clear demonstration of U.S. commitment through the use of intelligence assets as a low-visibility, non-lethal force multiplier. A strengthened intelligence posture in the Third World would be a strong indicator of our commitment to deal effectively with this important arena of conflict. We have demonstrated such resolve in our support to El Salvador. Secondly, such collaboration demonstrates to host-nation commanders the value of tactical intelligence as well as the importance of effective interaction between intelligence and operations. This merging of intelligence assets also strengthens bilateral military relations; frequently this cooperation provides positive spin-offs, such as strengthened political relations. Finally, it provides two-way educational opportunities for U.S. personnel: we instruct host-nation

personnel on U.S. systems; while we learn host-nation procedures and talents.<sup>36</sup>

### HUMINT Sharing

Effective HUMINT operations in a LIC environment, whether bilateral, multilateral, or unilateral, require centralized planning and decentralized execution initially. Experience with LIC contingency operations in Grenada or Panama suggest that the combat phases are of relatively short duration in which decentralized execution of HUMINT provides the most efficient use of intelligence assets. As soon as the combat phase transitions into the nation-building phase, HUMINT planning, coordination, and execution lends itself to centralized control at the operational level. General Stewart clearly explained in his 1988 article in Military Review the military organization options for various operations in LIC.

Due to the centralized control of U.S. intelligence involvement in LIC environments, the information flow tends to be restricted by compartmentalization. Since the Director of CIA is charged with responsibility for HUMINT collection on foreign soil, more cooperation between tactical military intelligence organizations, the Ambassador's staff, and the CIA seems appropriate. In his address to the National Military Intelligence Association, Brigadier General Shachnow commented on this issue:

For far too long, the intelligence community



has been content to be a passive participant in Special Operations and LIC. They collect the strategic information, analyze it and pass around to policy agencies and officials. When this country's leadership decides to act on a specific threat, the tactical intelligence to ensure success is missing and then we have no alternative but to walk away.<sup>37</sup>

The CIA is responsible for collecting and providing strategic HUMINT; the military concentrates on collecting and providing tactical HUMINT. As military intelligence organizations are reduced in size in concert with the force reduction, mutual support among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence units must continue to improve. Complaints of insufficient resources cannot be an acceptable excuse for bureaucratic impediments of sharing intelligence, training opportunities, and data bases. Establishing harmony in the interagency coordination process is a tall order, but it is obviously critical to success.

#### Succinct Guidance

Ambiguity is a recognized and a basic aspect of LIC. The State Department and the U.S. Ambassador have the lead in responding to LIC. Leadership is a challenge because of the many governmental agencies with responsibilities in LIC. It is understandable that politicians want to give peaceful negotiations every chance to succeed; they will likely forestall military action until there is no alternative. However, restraining military planning and intelligence collection until

the crisis has become critical can lead to failure. Limited resources and development of productive intelligence sources, which require long lead time, forces military planners to be proactive if they hope to succeed in contingency operations. Thus, it is critical that senior commanders and officials in charge of LIC resources work together and respond cooperatively to high level leadership.<sup>38</sup>

It follows then that the initial step is to get clear guidance from the National Command Authority. Guidance from the National Security Council on LIC guidelines and priorities should come from National Security Directives, used to promulgate national policy and objectives for national security. They should come from the National Security Review, used to initiate studies for national security policy and objectives. Defense Planning Guidance, issued by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joints Chief of Staff, to the Unified and Specified Commanders and DoD intelligence activities should state the strategic plan for developing and employing future forces.<sup>39</sup> Parallel guidance should come from the NSC to the State Department and the CIA to reinforce common goals in the interagency coordination process. The Defense Planning Guidance document is published biannually; it would thus provide a good vehicle to keep such guidance reasonably current for military planners.<sup>40</sup>

A second step in improving HUMINT support is to maintain command involvement. With definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense, supported and supporting commanders would have a

clearer sense of purpose in planning and assigning tasks to their intelligence resources. Periodic command review of intelligence estimates or other staff planning documents would give senior commanders an excellent opportunity to assess the value of intelligence efforts up to that point, as well as the need for further emphasis.<sup>41</sup>

Many of the coordination problems will be solved if operational commanders and intelligence officers review requirements periodically. It should be remembered that requirements must come from the commander. Effective communication between the intelligence officer, the operations officer, and the commander is fundamental for success.

#### Expertise, Training, and Professional Development

Expert HUMINT specialists possess marketable skills: a liberal arts education oriented on a geographical region, foreign language competency, and international relations credentials. Therefore, civilian businesses actively seek these experts for a variety of organizations. We must work to retain good people in HUMINT collection organizations. One attraction in military or civilian HUMINT work is the anticipated excitement and gratification in accomplishing important work in support of national security objectives. Unfortunately, bureaucratic lethargy quickly overcomes job satisfaction for these experts unless opportunities are available for them to practice their craft under real world conditions.<sup>42</sup> We must provide ample

opportunity for HUMINT soldiers to expand their skills and to experience real challenges by working among host-nation populations. Superb training and opportunities to perform what you have studied are essential to job satisfaction.

#### Exploitation of All HUMINT Sources

Interrogators are normally affiliated with combat operations soliciting information from captured enemy prisoners of war and captured documents. However, during peacetime, they could easily debrief travelers who have recently returned from countries where U.S. national interests require updated data bases. Additionally, approximately one million immigrants annually enter the United States. These people represent a source of information that could be valuable for national security purposes if properly approached by an informed debriefer or interrogator. Obviously, the interrogators must respect the rights of those who want to become U.S. citizens, but these people usually feel an obligation to help. They would be proud to provide information that they believe would save the lives of soldiers without feeling guilty, as if they were being manipulated as a spy. We also overlook, because of a lack of resources or focus, the many U.S. military personnel and other government officials who travel or are assigned to areas where U.S. national interests are focused in response to a possible LIC confrontation. Bureaucratic reporting procedures, lack of available interrogators, lack of stated information requirements, lack of

appreciation for the possible quality of information that could be gained with the expended effort, and lack of qualified analysts or interrogators to collect the information all detract from this source of intelligence.

Another valuable source of available information which could be exploited with additional emphasis and resources is the vast number of U.S. government employees living overseas. They could be approached to gain their perspectives. High school and college exchange students also have experiences and insight into the country where they lived and studied. Permitting these students the opportunity to share their ideas and perceptions could provide help in maintaining our data bases. Academicians and business people who travel and gain insight into particular areas of the world could be of assistance. Again, the approach to these citizens would be very unassuming; they should view their cooperation as an opportunity for them to provide their ideas to our decision-makers on what the future may hold. And lastly, news media capabilities and personnel throughout the world will continue to provide critical insight and early indicators in many parts of the world. Resourcing to exploit these potential sources of information will mean either retraining in-place personnel and redirecting their efforts or developing an alternate solution.

#### HUMINT Dilemmas in LIC

A basic theme underlying all discussion on improving

intelligence support for LIC is the need for more and better HUMINT support. Why is this a dilemma? Nations protect their national security in a variety of ways, and one of them is with espionage laws. If a U.S. government representative who is sent to a foreign country to determine the nature of a developing threat and the intentions of those leaders harboring plans hostile to the U.S. national interests is caught he will probably be found guilty of violating that country's espionage laws and will create an international incident. The U.S. might be able to give such an individual some form of diplomatic protection before entering the country, but if he is known to be a representative of the U.S. government his assimilation into the local environment will be limited. He will not be able to develop the rapport with target country representatives that he would need to access their real plans and determine any hostile intentions. If such an individual did not have some sort of official protection, he would need some other form of cover to mask his true intentions for being in the country seeking information. If he is compromised, he would become fully vulnerable to the consequences of the country's espionage laws. He would not be protected by prisoner-of-war status.<sup>43</sup> This concern constrained the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade from aggressive HUMINT collect during the later days of the Manuel Noriega regime in Panama.<sup>44</sup>

Other legal constraints include Executive order 12333 and Congressional Oversight of what latitude is offered U.S. HUMINT activities. News media personnel cannot be used as a cover for

intelligence collection. Neither can VISTA, Red Cross, Peace Corps, missionary, or other internationally recognized humanitarian organizations be used as a cover for covert HUMINT collection activities. However, nothing prohibits intelligence analysts from debriefing these individuals to gain an appreciation of their insights into and perceptions of the local populace.

The public equates covert action to intelligence. Covert action is not intelligence. Covert action, or covert operations, are planned and executed to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.<sup>45</sup> Covert action is the conduct of foreign policy. Its object is to affect the course of events but to limit knowledge and attribution of the activity.<sup>46</sup> Several instances of misappropriated funds or misdirected activities under the guise of secrecy increased congressional oversight on covert operations. Debate continues over whether congressional oversight is beneficial or detrimental to the national cause. Some believe oversight forces congressional involvement with covert actions and thus causes shared blame. Some argue that congressional involvement forces debate and scrutiny which protect civil liberties and constrain administration or military adventurous application of clandestine or covert operations. Others believe congressional oversight causes intelligence leaks and accomplishes little because Congress's only concern is plausible denial. Stansfield Turner, ex-Director of the CIA, believes that we could not have good intelligence without accountability; and that congressional

oversight has value.<sup>47</sup> Congress will continue its distrust of clandestine operations just as it does covert operations because of the associated secrecy with these types of operations and possibilities of compromise and embarrassment to the U.S. Consequently, we must be innovative in developing various HUMINT sources; not just relying on clandestine operations.

Intelligence can be used for public diplomacy: to convince or discourage perceptions of oppositions party ideals, capabilities, or modus operandi, or to highlight the current state of affairs in client states where U.S. interests intervene. Obviously, the temptation exists to format intelligence into a policy implementing tool rather than an impartial information gathering and analytical tool as designed for national purpose.

And lastly, while such melded intelligence activities with host-nations can offer significant bonuses, they can also present difficulties and sometimes unexpected challenges as well. Problems may arise from basic cultural differences. There are significant cultural, political, and resource implications of focusing the country's attention on "intelligence." In many Third World areas the term "intelligence" is often synonymous with "internal security." Even after the value of true intelligence is accepted, there remains the task of organizing and applying timely and sustained intelligence. Human rights violations or corruption within the host-nation leadership may obstruct U.S. HUMINT intelligence efforts. And finally, we may believe that intelligence is one of the key ingredients to success in LIC operations; but if we do not convince the local



leadership, it cannot play it's crucial and beneficial role.<sup>48</sup>

### Conclusion

Low-Intensity Conflict presents exacting demands on our national leaders and intelligence system. LIC exists in the majority of Third World nations; some require U.S. attention. Ascertaining the best responses to LIC support requests becomes more difficult for U.S. decision-makers as political, economic, social, and military divergence prohibits easy solutions. Many prominent leaders have concluded that access to information may be the most potent "weapon" in LIC. Decision-makers require the information to anticipate where, when, and why Third World leaders will step forward and request U.S. support for LIC.

One method of demonstrating U.S. resolve in a LIC situation is to share intelligence collection, analysis, and education with host countries. Combined intelligence activities with host nations offer several benefits. "Commitment" of a bilateral intelligence effort is less controversial for legislatures, both in the U.S. and host country. The process assists threatened governments in learning the proper role for intelligence and the requirement for effective interaction between operations and intelligence. The opportunity to send U.S. military intelligence personnel to work with foreign nationals strengthens the U.S. training base and produces the needed HUMINT regional experts.

We must not ignore what it takes to develop HUMINT experts in LIC. HUMINT expertise evolves from study and application. We

need HUMINT personnel who are truly regional experts. These experts should know the language, the society, the history, the politics, the real and perceived needs of the people, and those areas that are susceptible to exploitation by insurgents. HUMINT experts should have the opportunity to spend time in their region and update the national intelligence data base while learning more about the local populace. The result will be a better intelligence data base, an ability to anticipate probable LIC demands on our leaders, and a core of HUMINT experts who are confident and satisfied with their profession.

Our leaders have articulated our national interests for the next decade. They also understand how some of our national interests remain in the realm of LIC, especially concerning drugs, terrorism, and challenges to the promotion of democracy in Central and South America. National Security Directives and Defense Planning Guidance documentation provide ample opportunity for the National Security Council and the Security of Defense to provide parallel guidance to the commanders and the intelligence community on what their appropriate roles are in LIC support for our national interests.

Simultaneously, commanders at all levels must review, exercise, and insure intelligence activities are planned and sufficient for possible contingencies. The review of operation plans, intelligence annexes, intelligence data bases-as well as exercising portions of the operation plans-will insure that operations and intelligence personnel communicate routinely and thus build for success on the battlefield.

Congress will continue its distrust of covert HUMINT activities. Yet, leaders will expect more exact intelligence. Increased pressure will be applied to intelligence organizations. Solutions lie in the smart application and use of resources. We must train and develop ways to collect information from nontraditional sources that could be useful to intelligence analysts. We tend to focus on the exotic covert CIA case officer approach to HUMINT collection while overlooking less romantic but useful sources. Feedback from U.S. citizens travelling abroad, government employees, transients to the U.S. who have spent time in troubled countries can all provide information useful to intelligence analysts. News media personnel have more access to most foreign communities than do any other U.S. representatives. Missionaries, U.S. military mobile training teams, and exchange students all acquire valuable insight to many of the intangibles of regions in the world. Legal constraints prohibit considering these sources intelligence "collectors", however, asking individual impressions remains appropriate in certain situations when handled properly. Most citizens are interested in helping our government protect our national interests.

With the imminent reduction of the U.S. military and government agencies, we must become more resourceful in ways to access all available information which can keep our intelligence data bases current. The multi-polar world in which the United States now competes is more complex and complicated than the East-West focus against which we measured all of our past decisions. HUMINT will remain an essential source of

information in LIC, which will remain the most probable confrontation we will face in the future. General Gorman, while CINCSOUTH, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that intelligence resources are the key to the U.S. ability to come to grips with the difficulties presented in LIC. The most important intelligence resources are human, the development of which takes years of care, training, and education.<sup>49</sup> Through our understanding of the requirement, intelligence support for LIC can mature and keep pace with the demands of the future.

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